Advertising in a Differential Game of Spatial Competition

G. Bertuzzi and Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We investigate a dynamic duopoly game with horizontal product differentiation, to show that the standard approach to spatial competition fails to produce a pure strategy equilibrium in prices when treated in a differential game framework. This holds independently of the shape of the transportation cost function. Then, we introduce an endogenous costs associated with the choice of location and characterize the open-loop and closed-loop equilibria of the model, showing that in the closed-loop case firms invest more in product differentiation and less in advertising, than they do in the open-loop setting. This happens because the gains from product differentiation can be more easily internalised than those associated with advertising.

Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-geo, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:400

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