R & D Investment in Oligopoly: Betrand vs Cournot

Flavio Delbono and Vincenzo Denicolo' ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: Since the work of Schumpeter, it has been argued that there may exist a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. As a contribution to this debate, in this paper we compare the R&D performance of CCournot and Bertrand oligopolists. We model a one-shot noncooperative game in which firms invest in R&D, with the aim of being first in a competition for a patentable cost-reducing innovation.

Date: 1988-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:48

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