The issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game

Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We reformulate the monetary policy model of Barro and Gordon (1983a) by using an extended game with observable delay where the hierarchy of play between the central bank and the private sector is endogenous. This allows us to endogenise the institutional setup wherein the monetary policy game takes place. We show that positive inflation may be observed due to mixed strategies rather than time inconsistency.

Date: 2003
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Related works:
Journal Article: THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:489

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