Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation

Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini (luca.lambertini@unibo.it)

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in a duopoly where firms may either undertake independent ventures or form a cartel for cost-reducing R&D investments. By comparing the profit and welfare perfomances of the two settings in steady state, we show that private and social incentives towards R&D cooperation coincide for all admissible levels of the technological spillovers characterising innovative activity. This results stems from smoothing the investment reffort over the time horizon of the game.

Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic R&D with spillovers: Competition vs cooperation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:495

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