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Competition, Reputation and Compliance

Paolo Vanin ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper displays a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endogenously decide whether to enter the market and whether to specialize on high or low quality products, and then repeatedly interact to sell experience goods. It shows that the intuition that low and rising prices grant compliance with quality promises extends to this setting, provided that high quality is sufficiently important to buyers.

JEL-codes: L13 L14 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:682

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