Strategic Accessibility Competition
Emanuela Randon () and
Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna
We analyze the effect of competition in market-accessibility enhancement among quality-differentiated firms. Firms are located in regions with different ex-ante transport costs to reach the final market. We characterize the equilibrium of the two-stage game in which firms first invest to improve market accessibility and then compete in prices. Efforts in accessibility improvement crucially depend on the interplay between the willingness to pay for the quality premium of the median consumer and the ex-ante difference in accessibility between regions. From the social standpoint, all the accessibility investment should be carried out by the high-quality firm. Finally quality choice is endogenized.
JEL-codes: L13 L90 R42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse and nep-ind
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Journal Article: Strategic accessibility competition (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:696
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