Guards vs Vigilantes: The Effect of Rule Enforcement Strategies on Sustainable Use Norms in Common Property Regimes

Trevor Breen and Alessandro Tavoni ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper uses replicator dynamics to compare the steady states arising from two types of common property regimes - one in which over-exploiters are punished by the resource users themselves, and another where enforcement is handled by guards who collect a tax from the users. The use of guards requires a less restrictive set of parametric conditions in order to maintain an equilibrium with no over-exploiters. However, it can also stabilize an outcome in which all users over-exploit and are punished, but not enough to induce more cooperation (less resource extraction). These results can be used in guiding and structuring the formation of new common property regimes.

JEL-codes: C7 Q2 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/6564/1/WP1157.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1157

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().