The Degeneration of Workers’ Cooperatives under Endogenous Membership in Mixed Oligopoly

Flavio Delbono and Carlo Reggiani

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We propose a new model of mixed oligopoly where a workers’ cooperative firms competes with a number of profit maximising companies. Building upon a large empirical evidence, we innovate as compared to the traditional literature on the objective function of the cooperative; moreover, its membership is treated as endogenous in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We show which factors may be responsible of the degeneration of the Workers’ cooperative firms, which occurs when the number of members shrinks with respect to the overall employees.

JEL-codes: L21 L25 P13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-hme and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/7658/1/WP1194.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1194

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().