The Dynamics of Disease in a Regulated Vertically Differentiated Health System

Luca Lambertini () and Alessandro Tampieri

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We build up a differential game to investigate the interplay between the quality of health care and the presence of an evolving disease in a duopoly where patients are heterogeneous along the income dimension. We prove unicity, stability and perfection of the open-loop Nash solution. Moreover, we identify the admissible parameter region wherein price regulation achieves the twofold objectives of ensuring cares to all patients and eradicating the disease.

JEL-codes: C73 H42 I11 I18 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hea and nep-reg
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