Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution

Luca Lambertini () and Alessandro Tampieri

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement. We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding.

JEL-codes: L13 L51 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-ind
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Related works:
Journal Article: Do minimum quality standards bite in polluting industries? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp749

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