Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement

Maria Bigoni, Margherita Fort, M. Nardotto and Tommaso Reggiani ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.

JEL-codes: A22 C93 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-edu, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp752

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