Competition and Commercial Media Bias

Andrea Blasco and Francesco Sobbrio

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper reviews the empirical evidence on commercial media bias (i.e., advertisers inuence over news reports) and then introduces a simple model to summarize the main elements of the theoretical literature. The analysis provides three main policy insights for media regulators: i) Media regulators should target their monitoring efforts towards news contents upon which advertisers are likely to share similar preferences; ii) In advertising industries characterized by highly correlated products, an increase in the degreeof competition may translate into a lower accuracy of news reports; iii) A sufficiently high degree of competition in the market for news may drive out commercial media bias.

JEL-codes: D82 L13 L15 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-ind and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/4474/1/WP767.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Competition and commercial media bias (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp767

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().