On the Stability of Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria with CSR Firms

Luca Lambertini () and Alessandro Tampieri

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper examines the stability conditions of the equilibria in a market where profit-maximising and CSR firms coexist in the presence of an environmental externality. An equilibrium in mixed duopoly is stable for low impact of productivity on pollution and high CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus. In addition, a mixed oligopoly equilibrium is stable if the number of CSR is sufficiently low.

JEL-codes: H23 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-com
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives, performance and desirability of socially responsible firms in a Cournot oligopoly (2015)
Working Paper: Corporate Social Responsibility in a Mixed Oligopoly (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp768

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