Board of director collusion, managerial incentives and firm values

Rainer Andergassen

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent academic research hints at the social network of board of directors as an important conduit for coordinating corporate governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards.

JEL-codes: J33 L1 M52 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-hme
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/4443/1/WP795.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp795

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().