Are Self-regarding Subjects More Strategic?
B. Arru Ada,
Marco Casari and
Francesca Pancotto
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Benito Arruñada
Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna
Abstract:
To investigate the relationship between the depth of strategic thinking and social preferences we ask subjects in an experiment to perform dictator games and a guessing game. The guessing game measures depth of strategic thinking while dictator games control for social preferences. When performing a comparison within the same degree of strategic reasoning, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp805
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