EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

On price competition with market share delegation contracts

Michael Kopel and Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We identify a mistake in the specification of the demand system used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen et al. (2007), whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the alternative delegation scheme la Fershtman and Judd (1987).

JEL-codes: L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/4212/1/WP806.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On Price Competition with Market Share Delegation Contracts (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp806

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().

 
Page updated 2025-02-07
Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp806