On price competition with market share delegation contracts
Michael Kopel and
Luca Lambertini ()
Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna
Abstract:
We identify a mistake in the specification of the demand system used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen et al. (2007), whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the alternative delegation scheme la Fershtman and Judd (1987).
JEL-codes: L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Journal Article: On Price Competition with Market Share Delegation Contracts (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp806
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