Cross-border intellectual property rights: contract enforcement and absorptive capacity

Alireza Naghavi and Y. Tsai

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a Nash bargaining approach and distinguishes between the outcome and its actual enforcement. The absorptive capacity of the Southern country to exploit technology transfer plays a key role in the negotiated level of IPRs and its post-treaty enforcement. The optimal level of IPR protection relates positively to absorptive capacity. This provides a rationale for the longer time-frame provided to least developed countries in Article 66 of TRIPS to implement its provisions. In addition, monitoring is only effective in preventing contract violation up to a critical level of absorptive capacity. We relate this to the US Trade Representative Special 301 report, which flags countries that deny adequate IPR protection as priority watch list . While disputes with less developed economies are promptly resolved, emerging economies, where most losses from copyright piracy originates from, continue to remain on the list.

JEL-codes: C70 D78 F13 F53 L10 O33 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity (2015)
Working Paper: Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity (2012)
Working Paper: Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp809

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