Exploration for Nonrenewable Resources in a Dynamic Oligopoly: An Arrovian Result

Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: I investigate two versions of a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource exploitation, in which each firm may either exploit its own private pool or exploit a common pool jointly with the rivals. Firms use a deterministic technology to invest in exploration activities. In both models, there emerges that (i) the individual exploration effort is higher when each firms has exclusive rights on a pool of its own, and (ii) depending on the assumptions on technology and demand, the aggregate exploration effort is either constant or increasing in the number of firms.

JEL-codes: C73 L13 Q30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-env
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Related works:
Journal Article: EXPLORATION FOR NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES IN A DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY: AN ARROVIAN RESULT (2014)
Working Paper: Exploration for Nonrenewable Resources in a Dynamic Oligopoly: An Arrovian Result (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp859

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