On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluting emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then given using a differential game based on the Cournot oligopoly model, in which (i) the bearings on resource preservation of Pigouvian tax rate tailored on emissions are singled out and (ii) the issue of the optimal number of firms in the commons is also addressed.

JEL-codes: C73 H23 L13 O31 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/4101/1/WP976.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp976

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().