Competition among Coalitions in a Cournot Industry: A Validation of the Porter Hypothesis

Luca Lambertini (), G. Piagnataro and Alessandro Tampieri

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We determine the emergence of the Porter Hypothesis in a large oligopoly setting where the industry-wide adoption of green technologies is endogenously determined as a result of competition among coalitions. We examine a setting where the initial technology is polluting, firms decide whether to be brown or green and compete in quantities. We find that the Porter hypothesis may emerge as a market configuration with all green firms spurred by environmental regulation, even if consumers are not environmentally concerned. Finally, we single out the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the green grand coalition is socially optimal and therefore yields a win-win outcome.

JEL-codes: L13 L51 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition among coalitions in a cournot industry: a validation of the porter hypothesis (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp989

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