Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly
Luca Lambertini ()
Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna
I propose a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under (quasi-static) open-loop and nonlinear feedback strategies, where firms are managerial and two alternative types of delegation contract are considered. Under open-loop information, delegation expands the residual steady state resource stock. Conversely, under nonlinear feedback information the outcome depends on the structure of managerial incentives. If sales are used, once again delegation favours resource preservation. On the contrary, if market shares are included in the delegation contract, this combines with an underlying voracity effect in shrinking the steady state volume of the resource.
JEL-codes: C73 L13 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-cse
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Chapter: Managerial Delegation in a Dynamic Renewable Resource Oligopoly (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp990
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().