Relevant Decision Problems and Value of Information

Lily Ling Yang ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we employ a novel approach to study the value of information in games. A decision problem is relevant to another if the optimal decision rule of the former, when applied to the latter, is better than making a decision without any information in the latter. In a game, if the problem originally faced by a player is relevant to the problem induced by a change of the situation, the player benefits more from her own information after the change. Using the notion of relevance, we study the value of information in various games, even when a closed form solution is not available.

Keywords: Value of information; Quadratic game; Global game; Persuasion game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_025

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