A Nazi 'Killer' Amendment

Benny Moldovanu () and Andreas Kleiner ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We study killer amendments under various informational regimes and postulated voter behavior. In particular, the success chances of killer amendments are shown to differ across several well-known binary, sequential voting procedures. In light of this theory, we describe a remarkable instance of a motion-proposing and agenda-setting strategy by the Nazi party, NSDAP, during the Weimar Republic. Their purpose was to kill a motion of toleration of the new 1928 Government, and they were supported by their fiercest enemies on the far left, the communist party. The combined killer strategy was bound to be successful, but it ultimately failed because of another agenda-setting counter-move undertaken by the Reichstag president.

Keywords: sequential voting; killer amendment; agenda-setting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-his
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_032

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