Patent Pools, Vertical Integration, and Downstream Competition
Markus Reisinger () and
CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany
Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and non-linear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: Whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade-off between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. We then formulate information-free policies to screen anticompetitive pools.
Keywords: patent pools and horizontal pricing agreements; complementary patents; vertical integration and restraints; antitrust policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 L41 L42 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-law and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Patent pools, vertical integration, and downstream competition (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_057
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