Optimal Retail Contracts With Return Policies

Ying-Ju Chen (), Zhengqing Gui (), Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden and Xiaojian Zhao

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: A central problem in vertical relationships is to minimize the mismatch between supply and demand. This paper studies a problem of contracting between a manufacturer and a retailer who privately observes the retail demand materialized after the contracting stage. Cash payments are bounded above by the retailer’s revenue, while the return of unsold inventories is bounded above by the order quantity net of the actual quantity sold. While the majority of the papers in the literature takes the contractual forms as given and investigates the consequences that these contracts may lead to in various contexts, without assuming any functional form of contracts, we show that the optimal contract can be implemented by a buy-back contract: the manufacturer requests an upfront payment from the retailer and buys back the unsold inventories at the retailer’s salvage value. The optimality of buy-back contracts is robust to several scenarios including competition between retailers.

Keywords: Retail contracts; return policies; buy-back contracts; incentive problems; limited liability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 L42 L60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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