Information Transmission in Voluntary Disclosure Games

Avi Lichtig () and Ran Weksler

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: Does a better-informed sender transmit more accurate information in equilibrium? We show that, in a general class of voluntary disclosure games, unlike other strategic communication environments, the answer is positive. If the sender’s evidence is more Blackwell informative, then the receiver’s equilibrium utility increases. We apply our main result to show that an uninformed sender who chooses a test from a Blackwell-ordered set does so efficiently.

Keywords: Evidence; Informativeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_405

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