Platform-Enabled Information Disclosure

Jacopo Gambato () and Martin Peitz

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We analyze consumers’ voluntary information disclosure in a platform setting. For given consumer participation, the platform and sellers tend to prefer limited disclosure of consumer valuations, in contrast to consumers. With endogenous consumer participation, seller and platform incentives may be misaligned, and sellers may be better off when consumers can disclose their valuations. A regulator acting in the best interest of consumers and/or sellers may want to intervene and force the platform to employ a disclosure technology that enables consumers to voluntarily disclose information from a richer message space.

Keywords: Two-sided platform; platform governance; information disclosure; information design; privacy regulation; e-commerc (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D42 L12 L15 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Platform-enabled information disclosure (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_468

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