Simple Allocation with Correlated Types

Axel Niemeyer () and Justus Preusser ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: An object is allocated among a number of agents. The optimal allocation depends on the agents’ information about their peers, but each agent wants the object for themself. Monetary transfers are unavailable. We consider mechanisms where it is a dominant strategy to report truthfully. We show that deterministic mechanisms do not generally suffice for implementation and optimality, and that anonymous mechanisms cannot meaningfully elicit information. However, there are simple mechanisms—jury mechanisms—that are optimal when there are three or fewer agents, approximately optimal in symmetric environments with many agents, and the only deterministic mechanisms satisfying a relaxed anonymity notion. In a jury mechanism, each agent is either a juror or a candidate. The jurors decide which candidate wins the object, but jurors never win.

Keywords: Mechanism design without transfers; correlation; peer selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60
Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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