The Economic Theory of Two-Sided Platforms

Martin Peitz

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: In this chapter, I review the economic theory of two-sided platforms. First, I elaborate on the prevailing price structure in monopoly and oligopoly and explore the prevailing market structure. Second, I consider the choice of non-price strategies that affect users on the platform and address the horizontal and vertical scope of platforms.

Keywords: Two-sided platform; price theory; digital markets; network effects; platform design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L13 L41 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-ind, nep-pay and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_584

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