Sequential Equilibria in Mixed Strategies

Francesc Dilmé ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: A Nash equilibrium of a game in extensive form is a sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies if it can be approximated through equilibria of close-by games with slightly perturbed payoffs and small-probability behavioral types. We show that sequential equilibria in mixed strategies are equivalent to (i) weakly sequential equilibria (Reny, 1992), (ii) normal-form perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) in games with generic payoffs, and (iii) purifiable Nash equilibria (Harsanyi, 1973). A corollary of our results is that extensive-form perfect equilibria are normal-form perfect equilibria in games with generic payoffs.

Keywords: Sequential equilibria; mixed strategies; purification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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