Innovation in EU Merger Control: Theories of Harm and Efficiencies

Martin Peitz

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: Innovation and the diffusion of new technologies are central to consumer welfare in dynamic markets. On the one hand, mergers may harm innovation by removing independent innovation paths, restricting access to key inputs for innovation, or weakening incentives to adopt and diffuse new technologies. On the other hand, mergers may generate innovation efficiencies when they combine complementary tangible and intangible assets. This article discusses how the revised EU Merger Guidelines should evaluate these opposing forces and proposes a structured approach to assessing innovation harms and efficiencies while ensuring that merger control remains focused on effective competition and consumer welfare.

Keywords: EU merger control; innovation theories of harm; innovation efficiencies; start-up acquisitions; EU Merger Guidelines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L40 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7
Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law, nep-reg and nep-sbm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_741

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