Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians - Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program

Fernanda Brollo ()

No dp-168, Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents evidence that central government has a very important role in improving the quality of oce-holders when political clientelism is present. Exploiting the exogenous variation of the release of the audit reports and the Brazilian institutional scheme, there is evidence that the central government reduces the amount of infrastructure transfers to municipalities with unveiled corrupt mayors after the release of the audit reports. Furthermore, the e ects of the dissemination of corruption information on the probability of incumbent's re-election seem to gradually disappear with time. Then, when the corruption information is gone, voters punish corrupt politicians as a consequence of the reduction on transfers.

Pages: 34
Date: 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians – Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program (2008)
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