Markets and Jungles
Thomas Gall and
Paolo Masella
No dp-187, Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
Abstract:
Institutions affect prospects for economic growth and development. In this paper a condition on the primitives determines whether an economy supports markets. Agents differ in land holdings, skill, and power. A competitive market assigns land efficiently to the skilled, not necessarily to the powerful. Therefore a market allocation needs to be stable with respect to coalitional expropriation. More equally distributed power and higher congruence of land and power favor stable markets. In a dynamic setting, we identify conditions that ascertain whether markets are stable forever, or alternate with expropriation in a limit cycle, decreasing efficiency and amplifying macroeconomic fluctuations.
Keywords: Expropriation; consistent set; inequality; volatility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D70 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2009-02
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Related works:
Journal Article: Markets and jungles (2012) 
Working Paper: Markets and Jungles (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-187
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