Peer Effects in Legislative Voting
Raymond Fisman and
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Nikolaj Harmon: University of Copenhagen
Raymond Fisman: Boston University
Emir Kamenica: University of Chicago
No dp-304, Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote, but peer effects are markedly stronger among women, among MEP pairs from the same country, and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the two venues of the Parliament (Brussels and Strasbourg), we also show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in the past are less likely to disagree even when they are not seated adjacently.
Keywords: seating; influence; European Parliament (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 F53 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-304
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