Worker Sorting, Taxes and Health Insurance Coverage
Kevin Lang and
Hong Kang ()
Additional contact information
Hong Kang: Department of Economics, Boston University
No WP2005-011, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
Abstract:
We develop a model in which firms hire heterogeneous workers but must offer all workers insurance benefits under similar terms. In equilibrium, some firms offer free health insurance, some require an employee premium payment and some do not offer insurance. Making the employee contribution pre-tax lowers the cost to workers of a given employee premium and encourages more firms to charge. This increases the offer rate, lowers the take-up rate, increases (decreases) coverage among high (low) demand groups, with an indeterminate overall effect. We test the model using the expansion of section 125 plans between 1987 and 1996. The results are generally supportive.
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
Working Paper: Worker Sorting, Taxes and Health Insurance Coverage (2010)
Working Paper: Worker Sorting, Taxes and Health Insurance Coverage (2007) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2005-011
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Program Coordinator ().