Decentralization, Corruption And Government Accountability: An Overview

Dilip Mookherjee and Pranab Bardhan

No WP2005-023, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: In summary, the effects of decentralization on corruption and government accountability are complex and cannot be summarized by simple, unconditional statements. This applies equally to theoretical analyses, cross-country regression results and more detailed empirical studies of specific countries. In this essay we reviewed the literature dealing with two principal accountability mechanisms: external competition with other governments, and internal democratic pressures.

Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2005-06, Revised 2005-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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