Education and Labor-Market Discrimination

Kevin Lang and Michael Manove

No WP2006-008, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: We propose a model that combines statistical discrimination and educational sorting that explains why blacks get more education than do whites of similar cognitive ability. Our model explains the di¤erence between blacks and whites in the relations between education and AFQT and between wages and education. It cannot easily explain why, conditional only on AFQT, blacks earn no more than do whites. It does, however, suggest, that when comparing the earnings of blacks and whites, one should control for both AFQT and education in which case a substantial black-white wage di¤erential reemerges. We explore and reject the hypothesis that di¤erences in school quality between blacks and whites explain the wage and education di¤erentials. Our ?ndings support the view that some of the black-white wage di¤erential re?ects the operation of the labor market.

Pages: 30pages
Date: 2006-02
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Journal Article: Education and Labor Market Discrimination (2011)
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