Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Female Top Executives
Stefania Albanesi () and
Claudia Olivetti ()
No WP2006-061, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
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Working Paper: GENDER AND DYNAMIC AGENCY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF FEMALE TOP EXECUTIVES (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-061
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