Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Female Top Executives

Stefania Albanesi and Claudia Olivetti

No WP2006-061, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Pages: 23pages
Date: 2006-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: GENDER AND DYNAMIC AGENCY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF FEMALE TOP EXECUTIVES (2007)
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