THE DISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF REFORMS IN CREDIT ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM INDIAN DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNALS

Dilip Mookherjee, Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal and Sujata Visaria

No WP2010-034, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: It is generally presumed that stronger legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers because it expands the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This result relies on an assumption that the supply of credit is in nitely elastic. In contrast, with inelastic supply, stronger enforcement generates general equilibrium e ects that may reduce credit access for small borrowers and expand it for wealthy borrowers. In a rm-level panel, we nd evidence that an Indian judicial reform that increased banks' ability to recover non-performing loans had such an adverse distributive impact.

Keywords: credit enforcement; general equilibrium e ect; inelastic credit supply; distributive impact. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 66 pages
Date: 2010-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals (2012)
Working Paper: The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence from Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals (2010)
Working Paper: The Distributive impact of reforms in credit enforcement: Evidence from Indian debt recovery tribunals (2009)
Working Paper: The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence from Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2010-034

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Program Coordinator ().