Self-Deception and Choice

Jawwad Noor and Jawwad Noor ()
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Jawwad Noor: Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine

No WP2010-042, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: The temptation literature has provided models where desires attain satisfaction by commanding the agent’s attention. We consider a model of self-deception, where desires command the agent’s reasoning, leading her to rationalize and justify actions that eventually lead into temptation. Formally, we write axioms for a three-period extension of Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2001) framework and obtain a special functional form for the temptation utility at the interim stage. The representation portrays an agent who is tempted (i) to relax her normative attitude towards future indulgence and (ii) to turn a blind eye to any possibility of temptation altogether. Welfare implications of self-deception are discussed.

Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2010-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Self-Deception and Choice (2009)
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