Temptation and Social Preference
Jawwad Noor () and
Linxia Ren ()
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Linxia Ren: Department of Economics, Boston University
No WP2011-040, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
This paper shows in an experiment that giving rates in a dictator game increase significantly if payments are offered with delay. We hypothesize that a temptation to be selfish may be at play in social preferences. We model this and demonstrate that our model is consistent with much of the existing evidence on dictator games as well. The possible relationship with other social preference theories, such as warm glow, altruism and concern for social image, are discussed and differences in welfare conclusions highlighted.
Keywords: Normative preference; temptation; social preference; dictator games; welfare; warm glow; altruism; social image (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2011-040
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