A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections

Laurent Bouton

No WP2012-001, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the properties of runoff electoral systems when voters are strategic. A model of three-candidate runoff elections is presented, and two new features are included: the risk of upset victory in the second round is endogenous, and many types of runoff systems are considered. Three main results emerge. First, runoff elections produce equilibria in which only two candidates receive a positive fraction of the votes. Second, a sincere voting equilibrium does not always exist. Finally, runo¤ systems with a threshold below 50% produce an Ortega effect that may lead to the systematic victory of the Condorcet loser.

Keywords: Runoff Elections; Duverger's Law and Hypothesis; Condorcet Loser; Poisson Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
http://people.bu.edu/lbouton/Runoff.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://people.bu.edu/lbouton/Runoff.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://people.bu.edu/lbouton/Runoff.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections (2013)
Working Paper: A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2012-001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Program Coordinator ().