Experience Benefits and Firm Organization

Ching-to Ma, Ingela Alger and Régis Renault

No WP2012-007, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: A principal chooses between in-house production and outsourcing. An agent will be hired when production is in-house. An agent will be contracted upon when production is outsourced. In each case, the agent earns experience benefits: future monetary returns from managing production, reputation, and enjoyment. The principal would like to extract experience bene ts. He can do so when production is outsourced. But the external agent earns information rent from private information about production costs. The principal cannot fully extract experience bene ts when production is in-house because the internal agent must receive a minimum income, although the principal has full information on production costs. Our theory proposes a new trade-off, between information rent under outsourcing, and experience rent under in-house production. The principal chooses outsourcing when experience benefits are high. The principal's organizational choice may be socially inefficient.

Keywords: vertical integration; experience bene ts; experience rents; informational rents. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Experience Benefits and Firm Organization (2012)
Working Paper: Experience Benefits and Firm Organization (2009)
Working Paper: Experience Benefits and Firm Organization
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