Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement
Ching-to Ma () and
Henry Mak ()
No WP2012-008, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
A health care provider chooses medical service quality and cost-reduction effort. Both choices are noncontractible. An insurer observes both quality and cost effort, and may credibly disclose them to consumers. In prospective payment, the insurer fully discloses care quality, and sets a prospective payment price. In cost reimbursement, the insurer discloses a value index, a weighted average of quality and cost effort, and pays a margin above cost. The first-best quality and cost effort can be implemented by prospective payment and by cost reimbursement.
Keywords: prospective payment; cost reimbursement; fee for service; quality; cost reduction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-cta
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Journal Article: Information disclosure and the equivalence of prospective payment and cost reimbursement (2015)
Working Paper: Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2012-008
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Program Coordinator ().