Quality and Competition between Public and Private Firms
Liisa Laine and
Ching-to Ma ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sergei Koulayev ()
No wp2015-005, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
We study a multi-stage, quality-price game between a public firm and a private firm. The market consists of a set of consumers who have different quality valuations. A public firm aims to maximize social surplus, whereas the private firm maximizes profit. In the first stage, both firms simultaneously choose qualities. In the second stage, both firms simultaneously choose prices. There are multiple equilibria. In some, the public firm chooses a low quality, and the private firm chooses a high quality. In others, the opposite is true. We characterize subgame perfect equilibria for general consumer valuation distributions and quality cost functions, and provide conditions for first-best equilibrium qualities. Various policy implications are drawn.
Keywords: price-quality competition; quality; public firm; private firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 L2 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-ban
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Journal Article: Quality and competition between public and private firms (2017)
Working Paper: Quality and Competition between Public and Private Firms (2016)
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