Local Government Proliferation, Diversity, and Conflict
Samuel Bazzi and
Matthew Gudgeon ()
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Matthew Gudgeon: Boston University
No wp2016-002, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
The creation of new local governments is a key feature of decentralization in developing countries. This process often causes substantial changes in contestable public resources and the local diversity of the electorate. We exploit the plausibly exogenous timing of new district creation in Indonesia to iden- tify the implications of these changes for violent conflict. Using new geospatial data on violence, we show that allowing for redistricting along group lines can reduce conflict. However, these reductions are undone and even reversed if the newly defined electorates are ethnically polarized, particularly in areas that receive an entirely new seat of government. We identify several mechanisms highlighting the violent contestation of political control.
Keywords: Conflict; Polarization; Ethnic Diversity; Decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 H41 H77 O13 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pbe, nep-pol, nep-sea and nep-ure
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Working Paper: Local Government Proliferation, Diversity, and Conflict (2016)
Working Paper: Local Government Proliferation, Diversity, and Conflict
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2016-002
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