Information Acquisition, Referral, and Organization

Simona Grassi () and Ching-to Ma
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Simona Grassi: UniversitÈ de Lausanne

No wp2016-005, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Expertsícost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert e§ort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts e§ort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is ine¢ cient. Referral e¢ ciency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expertís cost. However, the referred expert shirks from work e§ort because of the lack of cost responsibility.

Keywords: information acquisition; referral; organization; adverse selection; cost-reduction incentive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D02 D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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http://people.bu.edu/ma/acquisition.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Information acquisition, referral, and organization (2016)
Working Paper: Information Acquisition, Referral, and Organization (2015)
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