Changing Preferences: An Experiment and Estimation of Market-Incentive EÂ§ects on Altruism
Undral Byambadalai (),
Ching-to Ma () and
Daniel Wiesen ()
Additional contact information
Daniel Wiesen: University of Cologne
No WP2019-11, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
This paper studies how altruistic preferences are changed by markets and incentives. We conduct a laboratory experiment in a within-subject design. Subjects are asked to choose health care qualities for hypothetical patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Prices, costs, and patient benefits are experimental incentive parameters. In monopoly, subjects choose quality to tradeoff between profits and altruistic patient benefits. In duopoly and quadropoly, we model subjects playing a simultaneous-move game. Each subject is uncertain about an opponentÌ s altruism, and competes for patients by choosing qualities. Bayes-Nash equilibria describe subjects' quality decisions as functions of altruism. Using a nonparametric method, we estimate the population altruism distributions from Bayes-Nash equilibrium qualities in diÂ§erent markets and incentive conOÌˆgurations. Markets tend to reduce altruism, although duopoly and quadropoly equilibrium qualities are much higher than those in monopoly. Although markets crowd out altruism, the disciplinary powers of market competition are stronger. Counterfactuals confirm markets change preferences.
Keywords: preferences; altruism; markets; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 C57 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 74 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2019-011
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Program Coordinator ().