Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era

Ing-Haw Cheng () and Alice Hsiaw
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Ing-Haw Cheng: Dartmouth College

No 129, Working Papers from Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School

Abstract: What deters individuals from reporting sexual misconduct, and what are the effects of #MeToo for reporting? We show that individuals under-report sexual misconduct if and only if a manager's misconduct is widespread. The reason is that individuals face a coordination problem and strategic uncertainty over whether others will also report misconduct. The coordination problem occurs because reports from multiple individuals corroborate a pattern of behavior and mitigate the chances of retaliation. We then study three unintended and intended consequences of #MeToo. First, managers may avoid mentoring individuals due to possible reporting. This selection effect spills over into individuals' willingness to report and can reduce the effectiveness of policies intended to encourage reporting. Second, heightened public awareness of misconduct encourages individuals to report otherwise-hidden misconduct by coordinating beliefs. Finally, whistleblower rewards mitigate this coordination problem when appropriately calibrated.

Keywords: Misconduct; Reporting; Retaliation; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 77 pages
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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http://www.brandeis.edu/economics/RePEc/brd/doc/Brandeis_WP129.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era (2022)
Working Paper: Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:brd:wpaper:129

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