Dispensing practices and antibiotic use

Massimo Filippini, Giuliano Masiero and Karine Moschetti

No 1006, Working Papers from Department of Management, Information and Production Engineering, University of Bergamo

Abstract: Regulation of prescription and dispensing of antibiotics has a twin purpose: to enhance access to antibiotic treatment and to reduce inappropriate use of drugs. Nevertheless, incentives on antibiotics to dispensing physicians may lead to inefficiencies. We sketch a theoretical model of the market for antibiotic treatment and empirically investigate the impact of self-dispensing on antibiotic consumption by means of spatial econometric estimators. The investigation exploits data from small geographic areas in a country where both regimes - with and without dispensing physicians - are possible. We find evidence that dispensing practices increase antibiotic use after controlling for determinants of demand and access, and spatial effects. This suggests that health authorities have a margin to adjust economic incentives on dispensing practices in order to reduce antibiotic misuse.

Keywords: Physician dispensing; prescribing behaviour; antibiotic use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Dispensing practices and antibiotic use (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:brh:wpaper:1006

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